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turbance of the very peace of families which it is alleged to protect, a
reference to Mr. Justice Holmes' admonition seems in order:
When we find that in large and important branches of the law the various
grounds of policy on which the rules have been justified are later inventions to
account for what are in fact survivals from more primitive times, we have a
right to reconsider the popular reasons and-taking a broader view of the field,
to decide anew whether those reasons are satisfactory.... If truth were not often
suggested by error, if old implements could not be adjusted ... human progress
would be slow. But scrutiny and revision are justified.62
62 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 37 (1945).
SOME ASPECTS OF INTERPRETATION AND APPLICA-
TION OF THE BROKERAGE CLAUSE OF THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
The Robinson-Patman Act' was enacted by Congress in 1936 to regu-
late price discrimination in or affecting interstate commerce. The act
amended section 2 of the Clayton Act 2 by enlarging it into six subsec-
tions numbered 2(a), 2(b), 2(c), 2(d), 2(e) and 2(f). These six subsec-
tions embody the core of the federal law on price discrimination. In the
twenty-four years since the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act, section
2 (c) 3 of the act has engaged the attention of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion and several courts of appeals to a far greater extent than any other
provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act.4 Most of the litigation has taken
place over the problem of interpretation and application of this section.
Though construed by several courts of appeals, the "Brokerage Clause"
(as section 2(c) is popularly known) received for the first time Supreme
Court review in 1960. It is the purpose of the writer to examine the legis-
lative history, the early court decisions, and the Supreme Court's recent
pronouncement in Federal Trade Commission v. Henry Broch & Co.,5 in
order to acquaint the reader with the more important aspects of interpre-
tation and application of section 2(c) today.
1 15 U.S.C.A. S 13 (Supp. 1959).
238 Stat. 730 (1914).
3 15 U.S.C.A. S 13(c) (Supp. 1959).
4 Statistics on the number of violations of each section of the Robinson-Patman Act
from 1936 to 1957 show that forty-seven per cent of the cease and desist orders (145 out
of 311) were issued by the Federal Trade Commission in brokerage cases. See generally
EDWARDS, THE PJUcE DISCRIMINATIoN LAW 68-72 (1959).
' 363 U.S. 166, rehearing denied, 29 U.S. L. WEEK 3104 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1960) (No. 61).
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THE STATUTORY LAW
Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits the payment of
brokerage, commissions, allowances or discounts by one party of a trans-
action of sale to the other party. The section provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a com-
mission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu
thereof, except for services rendered in connction with the sale or purchase of
goods, wares, or merchandise, either to the other party to such transaction or to
an agent, representative, or other intermediary therein where such intermediary
is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect control, of
any party to such transaction other than the person by whom such compensation
is so granted or paid. 6
The ambiguity7 and punctuation8 of this section has been regarded as
an excellent example of poor legal drafting. However, the language of
section 2 (c) represents an attempt to prohibit discriminatory price reduc-
tions effected through the guise of brokerage discounts. Payment of such
compensation, as well as receipt, is treated as an unfair trade practice.
SOCIO-POLITICAL HISTORY OF SECTION 2(c)
Absent socio-political perspective, it is difficult to understand why there
is a need for a federal law regulating wholesale distribution of goods in
interstate commerce. However, in the early 1930's, cut throat competi-
tion developed in the wholesale grocery business between the large chain
stores and the independent wholesalers and brokers. The independent
wholesalers and brokers feared that if manufacturers were permitted to
continue their practice of paying brokerage to buyers or to agents of
buyers, they would be "starved out of existence," and with them would
go the small manufacturers who depended on the independent whole-
,;15 U.S.C.A. § 13 (c) (Supp. 1959).
7 In Section 2(c), CCH Rohinson-Patman Act Symposium, 37-38 (1946), Austern
states that "The subsection is undoubtedly the most ambiguous in the Act which as a
whole has been universally regarded as a very unhappy example of legal drafting ....
subsection (c) has also been a source of delight to those lawyers who seek to distill the
true intent of a statutory provision by resort to typography. In almost every brief the
awkward phrases of the subsection have been thrown into italics, capitals, bold face,
colored inks, and every other form of 'emphasis added.' .... To students of legal seman-
tics this winding provision, said to embody agency principles, fiduciary concepts, pub-
lic policy, good business morals, and elementary economics, offered a wide field for
study."
s See Webb-Crawford Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 109 F. 2d 268, 270 (5th Cir.
1940). wvhere the court stated: "The punctuation as published is confusing.... Commas
are not to be suffered to defeat the legislative meaning."
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salers and brokers as their only sales organization, and the independent
retailers whom they supplied.0
A congressional investigation was conducted into the merchandising
practices of the chain stores by the Federal Trade Commission, and a final
report was made on this investigation in 1934.10 The report revealed the
coercive effects upon manufacturers of the chains' tremendous buying
power, which enabled them to obtain price concessions and to absorb the
broker's and commission man's functions by operating buying agencies as
subsidiaries. These practices enabled the chain stores to undersell inde-
pendents and engage in price discrimination in their retail stores." Early
attempts to correct this situation were made in the Codes of Fair Com-
petition developed by trade organizations in the food industry under the
National Industrial Recovery Act.' 2 Code provisions were established to
prohibit brokerage payments to direct purchasers or their buying affili-
ates.' 3 Later, when the Supreme Court declared the NIRA unconstitu-
tional,14 the National Food Brokers Association was successful in getting
the substance of the code provisions against "dummy brokerage" en-
acted as section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act.15
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 2 (c)
Legislative history of section 2 (c) reveals a general intent of Congress
to condemn as illegal, discriminatory prices cloaked as brokerage pay-
ments; but fails to reveal definitive answers to many problems that have
9 Fulda, Food Distribution in the United States, The Struggle Between Independents
and Chains, 99 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1051, 1096 (1951).
10 Federal Trade Commission, Final Report on the Chain-Store Investigation, S. Doc.
No. 4, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 32-40 (1934).
11 Subsequent analysis of chain store economies by McNair, Marketing Functions and
Costs and the Robinson-Patman Act, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 334 (1937), indicates that
integrated functions rather than buying power was the principal source of chain store
economies. A recent reanalysis by PALAMOUNTAIN, THE POLITICS OF DISTRIBUTION 62-72
(1955), has also challenged the validity of the conclusions of the Final Report on the
Chain Store Investigation, supra note 10. See also Heflebower, Mass Distribution: A
Phase of Bilateral Oligopoly or Competition? Papers and Proceedings of the Sixty-ninth
Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 47 AM. EcoN. REv. 274 (1957).
12 48 Stat. 196 (1933). The NIRA permitted businessmen and trade organizations to
draw up codes of fair competition in an effort to eliminate cutthroat competition in
commerce and reinvigorate the national economy. See generally Stem, The Commerce
Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. REv. 645 (1946).
13 Fulda, supra note 9, at 1095.
14 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
15 The genesis of the Robinson-Patman amendments and the so-called Fair Trade laws
in the wake of the NIRA is traced in PALAMOUNTA N, Tin,. POLITICS OF DISTmIBUTION,
chs. VIT-VIIT (1955).
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arisen under the section either because no explanation can be found for
the version finally adopted by the Congress or because conflicting views
and expressions of opinion permeate the legislative records. Nevertheless,
since the legislative history has been utilized by the courts to support
their construction of this section, a cursory exploration of congressional
thinking, as embodied in the various committee reports, is necessary for a
complete appreciation of the court decisions construing section 2(c). The
House Committee explained the absolute prohibition of section 2(c) (it
was then section (b)) by saying:
Section (b) permits the payment of compensation by a seller to his broker or
agent for services actually rendered in his behalf; Likewise by a buyer to his
broker or agent for services in connection with the purchase of goods actually
rendered in his behalf; but it prohibits the direct or indirect payment of broker-
age except for such services rendered. It prohibits its allowance by the buyer
direct to the seller, or by the seller direct to the buyer: and it prohibits its pay-
ment by either to an agent or intermediary acting in fact for or in behalf, or
subject to the direct or indirect control, of the other.16
A similar explanation was made in the Conference Committee Report,"7
but neither the House nor the Senate Committee Reports shed any light
on the meaning to be given the words "except for services rendered"'
18
and the phrase "or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof."'19 These
phrases, which are the source of much controversy, were also retained in
the bill. reported by the Conference Committee without any explanatory
comment. 20
Reports of the Judiciary Committees of the House and Senate set forth
in similar terms the broad objectives of section 2(c). In the language of
the Senate Report:
Among the prevalent modes of discrimination at which this bill is directed, is
the practice of certain large buyers to demand the allowance of brokerage direct
to them upon their purchases, or its payment to an employee, agent, or corporate
subsidiary whom they demand that sales to them be made. Whether employed
by the buyer in good faith to find a source of supply, or by the seller to find a
market, the broker so employed discharges a sound economic function and is
entitled to appropriate compensation by the one in whose interest he so serves.
But to permit its payment or allowance where no such service is rendered, where
in fact, if a "broker", so labeled, enters the picture at all, it is one whom the
16 H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1936).
17H.R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936).
18 H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1936). This phrase was added by the
House Committee without explanatory comment and is not contained in the Senate
Committee Report.
19 S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936). The Senate Committee added this
phrase without explanatory comment.
20 H.R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936).
COMMENTS
buyer points out to the seller, rather than one who brings the buyer to the seller,
is but to permit the corruption of this function to the purposes of competitive
discrimination. 21
In addition, both the Senate and House Reports emphasized the relation-
ship between broker and client as a fiduciary one and that to permit a
broker "to collect for services rendered in the interest of a party adverse
to him is a violation of that relationship. '2 2 Further, the reports stated
that it is desirable to protect those who deal in the streams of commerce
against breaches of faith in order to foster confidence in its processes and
promote its wholesomeness and volume.
Numerous statements concerning this section can be found in the con-
gressional hearings23 and debates, 24 but since statements can be found to
support almost any plausible argument advanced to explain the ambiguous
and controversial aspects of section 2(c), these statements are not illu-
minating upon congressional intent and therefore no useful purpose can
be served by their detailed examination. However, it is noteworthy to
point out that statements from the hearings and the debates have been
relied upon by some courts as evidence of legislative intent.25
EARLY COURT INTERPRETATION OF THE BROKERAGE CLAUSE
The Robinson-Patman Act went into effect on June 19, 1936 and the
Federal Trade Commission first moved under the brokerage section.
Eight of the orders of the Federal Trade Commission under this section
were appealed to the courts and within a few years judicial decision had
resolved the major problems in which the section bristled.26
Section 2 (a) 27 of the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits price discrimina-
21 S. REp. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936).
22 Ibid.
23 Hearings Before the House Judiciary Committee on Bills to Amend the Clayton
Act, 74th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., ser. 10, pts. 1, 2 (1935-1936); Hearings on S. 4171 Before
a Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
24 80 CONG. REc. 3114-16, 3118, 5728, 6281-82, 6285, 7324, 7759-60, 7886, 7980, 8111-12,
9414-15, 9417-18 (1936).
25 E.g., Henry Broch & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 261 F. 2d 725, 728 n.4 (7th
Cir. 1958), where the court relied on statements made in congressional hearings and
debates but overlooked the best evidence of legislative intent, the congressional commit-
tee reports.
26 See Auster, supra note 7, at 37.
27 Section 2 (a), 15 U.S.C.A. S 13 (a) (Supp. 1959), provides: "It shall be unlawful for
any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or
indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like
grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination
are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale
within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any
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tion which injures competition but permits price differentials based on
savings in selling costs resulting from differing methods of distribution. In
the first cases to reach the courts it was urged by respondents that sec-
tion 2 (a) and section 2 (c) were intended to be read together, and that the
affirmative defenses permitted by the cost differential provisos of section
2 (a) were equally available to a defendant accused of violation of section
2 (c); hence the payment or receipt of brokerage is illegal only when it is
injurious to competition and the respondent cannot establish a cost justi-
fication for the discrimination. One of the first cases to give insight as to
the direction the courts would take was Biddle Purchasing Co. v. Federal
Trade Conrmission.2s In deciding the Biddle case the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit rejected the argument that the limitations of section
2(a) should be read into section 2(c), concluding that "the complaint
here is under the provisions of section 2(c) and not section 2(a) of the
statute. The validity of the order entered is dependent entirely upon the
legality of section 2 (C)." 29 When a similar contention was made in
Oliver Bros., Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission,30 the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit said that the practice of granting a commission or
brokerage, or any allowance in lieu thereof, to the other party to the
transaction or his agent was forbidden because of its tendency to lessen
competition and create a monopoly, without regard to its effect in a par-
insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and where
the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition
with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimina-
tion, or with customers of either of them: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall
prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of
manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in
which such commodities are to such pui.hasers sold or delivered: Provided, however,
That the Federal Trade Commission may, after due investigation and hearing to all
interested parties, fix and establish quantity limits, and revise the same as it finds neces-
sary, as to particular commodities or classes of commodities, where it finds that avail-
able purchasers in greater quantities are so few as to render differentials on account
thereof unjustly discriminatory or promotivc of monopoly in any line of commerce;
and the foregoing shall then not be construed to permit differentials based on differences
in quantities greater than those so fixed and established: And provided further, That
nothing herein contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or
merchandise in commerce from selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions
and not in restraint of trade: And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall
prevent price changes from time to time where in response to changing conditions
affecting the market for or the marketability of the goods concerned, such as but not
limited to actual or imminent deterioration of perishable goods, obsolescence of seasonal
goods, distress sales under court process, or sales in good faith in discontinuance of
husiness in the goods concerned."
2- 96 F. 2d 687 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 634 (1938).
2) 96 F. 2d at 690.
:01 102 F. 2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939).
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ticular case. Therefore, the court held that there was no reason to read
into section 2(c) the limitations contained in section 2(a).31 Finally, in
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,82 the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that "paragraphs (a) and (c)
possess separate significance and are independent of each other,"8  and
that "paragraph (c) constitutes a specific prohibition of a specific act....
To read the words of paragraph (a) into paragraph (c) destroys the
Congressional intent."34 These three cases established the complete inde-
pendence of section 2(a) and section 2 (c). None of the affirmative de-
fenses of section 2 (a) are now available to respondents accused of vio-
lating section 2 (c), and proof of discrimination resulting in injury to
competition is not an element of the brokerage offense.85
Section 2 (c) provides that it shall be unlawful to pay or receive brok-
erage except for services rendered in connection with the sale or pur-
chase of goods.86 Inclusion of this phrase created an ambiguity which the
courts had to resolve without any illuminating help from legislative- his-
tory.37 It could be construed as either (1) having no effect at all; (2) as
suppressing clearly abusive demands for brokerage and permitting brok-
erage to buyers under some circumstances; or (3) as limiting payment to
independent brokers and preventing payment to buyer's agents. 8 Re-
spondents in the A & P case interpreted this language to mean that if a
buyer or a buyer's agent rendered services to the seller, a payment of
31 Id. at 766-767.
32 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939), affirming 26 F.T.C. 486 (1938), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
625 (1940), rehearing denied, 309 U.S. 694 (1940). (This case shall hereafter be referred
to as the A & P case.)
33 106 F. 2d at 675.
84 Id. at 677.
35 See Webb-Crawford Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 109 F. 2d 268, 269 (5th Cir.
1940), where the court pointed out: "The Congress considered the effect on commerce
of the things named in subsection (c), and absolutely prohibited them. The Trade
Commission is not to enter on any enquiry about their evil effect, nor whether a pro-
ceeding would be in the public interest. Its duty is to enforce the prohibition." To the
same effect see Southgate Brokerage Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 150 F. 2d 607,
609 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 774 (1945), where the court said: "The answer
is that price discrimination ... is not necessary to a violation of section 2 (c), quoted
above, which specifically forbids the payment of brokerage by the seller to the buyer
or the buyer's agent."
30 15 U.S.C.A. S 13 (c) (Supp. 1959). See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
37 See note 18 supra.
38 For discussion see Legislation, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 1285, 1313 (1936). See also Thorp
and George, Check List of Possible Effects of the Robinson-Patinan Act, Dunn and
Bradstreet Monthly Review, August, 1936, p. 16, where the authors comment: "Imagina-
tions are enjoying a free rein on the problem of what services a buyer's agent may render
to a seller to earn exemption from the otherwise flat prohibition against payment of
brokerage to him by the seller."
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brokerage for these services was legal. Accordingly, A & P sought to
prove that it had effected savings in distribution costs for manufacturers
by services performed by its purchasing organization, and offered volu-
minous evidence showing that its field buyers furnished manufacturers
market information, advice on methods whereby the quality of commodi-
ties could be improved, advice on packaging, traffic information on rout-
ing of shipments, and when manufacturers were threatened with a glut of
commodities which could break the market, they endeavored to relieve
the glut by buying commodities. In taking the position that neither a
buyer nor a buyer's agent can avail himself of the "services rendered" ex-
ception of 2 (c), the court said:
Ve entertain no doubt that it was the intcntion of Congress to prevent dual
representation by agents purporting to deal on behalf of both buyer and seller.
For this reason paragraph (c) is framed by disjunctives. The edge of the para-
graph cuts two ways, prohibiting the payment or receipt of commissions, dis-
counts or brokerage to the adversary party by the other's agent. The phrase
"except for services rendered" is employed by Congress to indicate that if there
be compensation to an agent it must be for bona fide brokerage, viz., for actual
services rendered to his principal by the agent. The agent cannot serve two
masters, simultaneously rendering services in an arm's length transaction to both.
While the phrase, "for services rendered", does not prohibit payment by the
seller to his broker for bona fide brokerage services, it requires that such service
be rendered by the broker to the person who has engaged him.. ..- The record
clearly requires the conclusion that the field buying agents of the petitioner were
the agents of the petitioner and that such services as were rendered by them to
sellers were purely incidental to such representative capacity. For such incidental
services, the petitioner may not be compensated.ao
Although the court utilized the legislative history of section 2(c) to
support its interpretation of the "services rendered" exception, 40 it has
been vigorously criticized as reading the "services rendered" exception
out of the statute.4 1 The net result is that the "services rendered" clause
Ot 106 F. 2d at 674-75.
40 The court relied upon H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. and quoted the
language of the report at page 15. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
41 In the Att'y. Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 187-193 (1955), the committee at
190, notes that prevailing "interpretations of the 'brokerage' clause [are] at odds with
broader antitrust objectives. Goods are sped to the consumer through marketing func-
tions, whether performed by independent 'brokers' or other . . . 'rniddle[men]'. . . . A
legal disqualification of all but the 'pure' broker's distributive services is thus at variance
with business realities .... [T]he 'brokerage' clause as presently interpreted enacts a
preferred position for the 'independent' broker, thus discriminating against competing
firms in distribution who are arbitrarily denied compensation for genuine marketing
functions which they perform .... In our opinion, the virtual legal monopoly conferred
by [S 2 (c) ] on one type of middleman clogs competition in the channels of distribution,
and exacts tribute from the consumer for the benefit of a special class." The committee
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of 2(c) has no application to buyers, their agents, or controlled inter-
mediaries, and does not set up a condition upon which brokerage may be
paid to any of them. The exception of "services rendered" refers solely
to services rendered in fact for the party paying the brokerage fee.
Hence, when brokerage is paid by the seller, the clause relates to selling
services rendered to the seller by his agent or broker. In such a case any
recommended that the Brokerage Clause be amended to revitalize the "except for serv-
ices rendered" clause.
Professor Oppenheim observed that "the 'soft competition' fostered by the act is
strikingly illustrated by the island of immunity created for independent brokers as a
result of the Commission's construction of 2 (c) on the basis of a mistaken analogy to
the fiduciary obligation of an agent to his -principal. The courts have sustained the
Commission's position that it is unlawful per se for the buyer or anyone acting for or
controlled by the buyer to pay or receive brokerage, even where services of value are
actually renderd to the seller. The result has been virtually to read out of the section
the phrase 'except for services rendered.' The presence of these words in subsection (c)
affords evidnce, however, that Congress recognized that the standard of reason might
be applied to certain situations where bona fide and actual services of value were
rendered by the buyer's agent. There is no justifiable reason why independent brokers
should be given a monopoly in their distribution function at the expense of established
or new methods of distribution that compete with such brokers in rendering services of
unquestioned value. The Commission's strained construction of 2 (c) has actually
worked hardship to small business faced with the necessity of resorting to cooperative
buying arrangements to compete on equal terms with chain stores and other mass buy-
ers." Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National
Antitrust Policy, 50 MicH. L. REv. 1139, 1207, n.178 (1952).
See Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition, and Confusion: Another Look at
Robinson-Patman, 60 YALE L.J. 929, 957-958 (1951). "[Rleceipt or payment of compen-
sation by either party to a transaction is illegal except when services are rendered.
Judicial interpretation, however, quickly read the exception out of the statute. Obvi-
ously direct buyers relieve a seller from paying intermediaries to find market outlets.
But these are not legal services-the buyer is 'doing his own work.' The market effects
of the brokerage clause are, therefore, simple. Because a direct buyer is denied func-
tional compensation, an unneeded broker picks up business or a seller pockets the value
of the function. The clause thus grants a legal tollgate to the broker or a windfall to
the seller. Ironically, small wholesalers' cooperative buying agencies are conspicuous
victims of strict FTC 'brokerage clause' enforcement."
See also Levi, The Robinson-Patman Act-Is It in the Public Interest?, in A.B.A.
SEcTioN or ANTITRUST LAW PROCEFDINcS, 60 (1952). The author concludes an acid criti-
cism with the following comment: "When stripped of its protective covering, however,
the brokerage section, with its flat prohibition, is an ugly example of class legislation."
For general discussion of this point, consult AusTIN, PRIcE DISCRIMINATION AND RE-
LATED PROBLEMS Under the Robinson-Patman Act 110-114 (2d rev. ed. 1959), and
Oppenheim, Administration of the Brokerage Provision of the Robinson-Patman Act,
8 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 511 (1940).
However, the court's interpretation has been supported by several courts of appeals.
Independent Grocers Alliance Distributing Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 203 F. 2d
941 (7th Cir. 1953); Southgate Brokerage Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 150 F. 2d
607 (4th Cir. 1945); Modem Marketing Service, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 149
F. 2d 970 (7th Cir. 1945); Quality Bakers of America v. Federal Trade Commission,
114 F. 2d 393 (1st Cir. 1940); Webb-Crawford Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 109 F.
2d 268 (5th Cir. 1940).
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services rendered to the seller by the buyer or his alter ego are incidental
and gratuitous. 42 Finally, the application of the ban of section 2(c) on
any allowance or discount in lieu of brokerage has not been fully settled.
The problem posed by this provision is whether a seller who ordinarily
utilizes brokers in selling a product may not reflect the non-use of brokers
in his sales to customers who buy direct. The court in the A &i P case
held that such a price reduction was an allowance in lieu of brokerage
within the meaning of section 2(c).43
Since the A & P case the FTC has modified its position. It no longer
contends that one who ordinarily sells through brokers automatically vio-
lates the "any allowance or discount in lieu" phrase of Section 2(c) if he
grants a lower price or special discount in approximately the same amount
of brokerage to certain customers buying direct. In Main Fish Co., Inc.,44
a complaint charged a seller in Seattle, Washington, who purchased fresh
fish in boat-load quantities, filleted, and resold to retailers, restaurants, and
wholesalers, with violating section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act by
favoring one direct buyer with prices lower than those charged all other
42 Oppenheim, Administration of the Brokerage Provision of the Robinson-Patman
Act, 8 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 511, 544 (1940).
43 106 F. 2d at 672, 675. The reason for this decision, and in fact for Congress's inserting
the proviso in section 2 (c), is illuminated by the history of the A & P case. Prior to the
Robinson-Patman amendments, A & P had obtained brokerage commissions from sellers
through its field buying agents in the same amounts as was paid by the sellers to brokers
acting as agents for such seller. 26 F.T.C. 486, 495 (1938). After June 19, 1936, the
effective date of the Robinson-Patman Act, A & P instructed its field buying agents to
accept no further brokerage and make all future purchases on one of three bases: (1)
to buy for "net prices" reflecting deductions in the amount of the former brokerage
commissions; (2) to execute "quantity discount agreements" with the seller providing
for payments to A & P monthly in an amount equal to brokerage paid by sellers prior
to June 19, 1936, or (3) to have the brokerage paid into escrow until the legality of
making such payments could be determined. The Federal Trade Commission found
that each of these practices was actually used by A & P (Id. at 495-96) and outlawed
them because they represented "an amount equal to the brokerage which, but for the
Robinson-Patman Act, these sellers would have paid" to A & P's field buying agents.
The FTC further stated that they were "passed on by the sellers and accepted by the
respondent to take the place of, and in substitution for, brokerage paid to the re-
spondent's field buying agents prior to that date," and accordingly "were allowances
and discounts in lieu of brokerage and were affirmatively intended as such by both
sellers and the respondent." Id. at 496, 501.
It is obvious that the congressional intent to stop the payment of brokerage commis-
sions to large chains like A & P would have been frustrated if the prohibition of the stat-
ute had turned on the question of whether the payments made were described as brok-
er's commissions or "net prices" and "quantity discounts." See ZORN & FELDMAN, Busi-
NESS UNDER THE NEW PRICE LAws 219 (1937), where the authors state that the "in lieu"
phrase must have been added by the Senate Judiciary Committee (note 19 supra) to
"prevent evasion of the restriction through a mere modification of the form of the sale
contract. It was assumed that large buyers would seek to convert the brokerage which
they had hitherto received into an outright price reduction."
44 53 F.T.C. 88 (1956).
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purchasers by the same amount as the five per cent brokerage which re-
spondent paid brokers for effecting sales to its indirect customers. The
opinion of the FTC states:
In rejecting the contention that price concessions by respondent to its direct
purchaser were payments in lieu of brokerage because others had to buy from
respondent through brokers who collected a fee of 5%, we do not exclude the
possibility of inferring the payment of brokerage monies or sums in lieu thereof
from surrounding circumstances, even though the parties to the sales do not
openly employ the terminology of brokers' dealings. We only hold that on facts
of this record such an inference does not appear warranted.4 5
In 1959 the Court of Appeals of the First Circuit, in Robinson v Stan-
ley Home Products, Inc.,46 affirmed a district court ruling 47 which re-
jected the contention that a seller's price reduction made possible by
elimination of services of a broker entirely, and conversion to direct sell-
ing, was an illegal allowance "in lieu" of brokerage to the buyer. Reject-
ing this contention, the court said:
To say that a manufacturer who makes a price reduction when he converts
to direct selling has, without more, made an allowance in lieu of brokerage
would either be to say that he cannot so convert, or that, if he does, the act for-
bids his passing on any saving to the customer. We do not so construe it.48
With this judicial precedent, it is clear that whether there has been a re-
payment of brokerage when the seller couples a lower price with a reduc-
tion or complete elimination of brokerage depends upon all the facts in
the particular case.
SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 2 (c)-
THE BROCH CASE
49
Henry Broch and Oscar Adler are copartners trading as Henry Broch
& Co.,50 with their main office and place of business in Chicago,
Illinois. Broch functions as an independent sales representative or broker
by negotiating the sale of frozen foods, frozen fruits, fruit juices, and
4; Id. at 97.
41 272 F. 2d 601 (1st Cir. 1959).
47 178 F. Supp. 230 (D. Mass. 1959)..
48272 F. 2d at 604.
49Federal Trade Commission v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, rehearing denied,
29 U. S. L. WEEK 3104 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1960) (No. 61). The writer wishes to express
his indebtedness to Mr. Harold Orlinsky Esq., counsel for Henry Broch & Co., for
making available his complete file of briefs, petitions, memorandums and transcript
of the proceedings, from the initial complaint through the Petition for Rehearing, filed
with the Supreme Court August 19, 1960.
5o Henry Broch and Oscar Adler, copartners trading as Henry Broch & Co., shall
hereafter be referred to as respondent, or Broch.
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other food products for about twenty-five seller principals. Respondent
negotiates an annual volume of sales approximating $4,000,000 to $5,00,-
000. One of the seller principals represented by Broch is Canada Foods,
Ltd., of Kentville, Nova Scotia, a processor of apple concentrate and sim-
ilar products. Canada Foods Ltd. is also represented in the United States
by several other brokerage firms, including Tenser & Phipps, Poole &
Company, and Cuylar.
After negotiations in April and May of 1954, respondent agreed to act
as exclusive agent for the Mid-Western sales territory for Canada Ltd.,
and the contract specified a five per cent rate of commission. Other brok-
ers working for the same principal were appointed with the understand-
ing that their rate of commission would be four per cent. Respondents
received a higher rate of commission because they stocked merchandise
in advance of sales. On October 11, 1954, Canada Foods Ltd. established
its price on its 1954 pack of apple concentrate at one dollar and thirty
cents per gallon in fifty gallon steel drums, and it authorized its various
brokers, including respondents, to negotiate sales at that price.
The present controversy originated in a sale of apple concentrate nego-
tiated by respondent with J. M. Smucker Company, Orville, Ohio (here-
inafter referred to as Smucker), a manufacturer of apple butter and pre-
serves. In negotiations carried on independently with both respondent
and Tenser & Phipps, the Smucker Company, a prospective buyer, ex-
pressly offered to buy five hundred drums at the lower price of one dol-
lar and twenty five cents. Canada Foods Ltd. was thereafter advised of
Smucker's tender by both Tenser & Phipps and by respondent. In the en-
suing discussions with Tenser & Phipps and Broch, Canada Foods Ltd.
took the position that the only way it could afford to reduce its price
below one dollar and thirty cents would be through some downward ad-
justment of the broker's commission. Tenser & Phipps declined to adjust
its commission and relayed this information to Smucker, explaining that
the order could not be confirmed at one dollar and twenty-five cents
since Tenser & Phipps was afraid that this would violate the Robinson-
Patman Act. On October 27, 1954, the very day that Canada Foods Ltd.
told Tenser & Phipps that the price could be reduced below one dollar
and thirty cents only if brokerage were cut, Canada Foods Ltd. tele-
phoned Broch and advised that it would make the sale at one dollar and
twenty-five cents per gallon provided Broch would agree to reduce its
brokerage commission from five per cent to three per cent. Broch agreed,
and advised Smucker that Canada Foods Ltd. would sell to it at one dol-
lar and twenty-five cents per gallon. The sale of five hundred steel drums
of apple concentrate at one dollar and twenty-five cents per gallon was
consummated, delivery made, and Broch received three per cent broker-
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age rather than the customary five per cent.51 The reduced price of one
dollar and twenty-five cents was thereafter accorded Smucker on all sub-
sequent sales consummated through Broch in December 1954, in 1955,
and up to the time that the hearings in this matter were closed in October
1956. On sales to all other customers, whether made through Broch or
other brokers, the price continued to be one dollar and thirty cents per
gallon, and in each instance the broker, including Broch, received its full
agreed-upon commission.
The Federal Trade Commission on January 11, 1956, issued a complaint
charging respondent with violations of section 2(c) of the Robinson-
Patman Act. Following hearings before an examiner and the filing of his
initial decision, and a cease and desist order, respondent appealed to the
FTC, which adopted the findings, conclusion and order of the examiner.
Respondent petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit to review and set aside the order of the FTC. The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit did not question the findings of fact of
the FTC (which were not in dispute) but unanimously set aside the or-
der against Broch. 52 The court's decision discussed four distinct, but re-
lated grounds for so holding: (1) neither the language of section 2 (c) nor
its legislative history covered an .independent seller's broker; (2) the
proceeding against the respondent was not in the public interest but re-
lated to a private grievance between rival brokers;53 (3) the acceptance
of a lower commission by a broker in order to enable his seller-principal
to quote a lower price to a particular buyer does not amount in substance
to the payment of brokerage, directly or indirectly, by the broker to the
buyer; and (4) the FTC's interpretation of section 2(c) would actually
promote price rigidity and uniformity contrary to the national antitrust
policy.
On certiorari, 54 the Supreme Court of the United States, divided five to
four, reversed the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and held that
section 2(c) "clearly applies to payments or allowances by a seller's
broker to the buyer, whether made directly to the buyer, or indirectly,
51 The customary brokerage fee of 5% to respondent would have been $2,036.84. The
actual brokerage of 3% received by respondent was $1,222.11. The reduction of broker-
age was $814.73 which is 50% of the total price reduction of $1,629.47 granted by Canada
Foods Ltd. to Smucker.
52 Henry Broch & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 261 F. 2d 725 (7th Cir. 1958).
5 One of the jurisdictional elements under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (Supp. 1959), is public interest. The Federal Trade Com-
mission does not view this act as a limitation to proceedings under the Robinson-
Patman Act. See Brief for the FTC (S.Ct.) p. 28. The Supreme Court did not discuss
this point. See also note 35 supra.
51 360 U.S. 908 (June 15, 1959).
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through the seller."" The four dissenters were Justices Whittaker, Frank-
furter, Harlan, and Stewart. They agreed that section 2(c)'s phrase "any
person" includes even a truly independent seller's broker. But the ques-
tion in this case, as they saw it, was whether the broker's agreement to
reduce his commission charged to the seller can amount to the paying or
the granting by the broker of an allowance to the buyer. They contended
that if the conduct involved in this case constituted such an allowance,
"then all legitimate commission rates are frozen in destruction of com-
petition and in actual violation of the antitrust laws."'5 6
This litigation is the first one directly involving the question of the
accountability of a seller's broker under section 2(c) of the Robinson-
Patman Act.57 And the decision is important not only because it is the
first Supreme Court interpretation of section 2(c), but also because it is
applicable to all industries operating in interstate commerce that tradi-
tionally employ brokers or sales representatives to negotiate the sale of
goods, wares or merchandise. Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the ma-
jority, construed the phrase "any person" in section 2(c) to include an
independent seller's broker. After stating that section 2 (c) is independent
of section 2 (a), the court reasoned:
Congress enacted the Robinson-Patman Act to prevent sellers and seller's
brokers from yielding to the economic pressures of a large buying organization
by granting unfair preferences in connection with the sale of goods. The form
in which the buyer pressure is exerted is immaterial and proof of its existence is
not required. It is rare that the motive in yielding to a buyer's demands is not the
"necessity" for making the sale. An "independent" broker is not likely to be inde-
pendent of the buyer's coercive bargaining power. He, like the seller, is con-
strained to favor the buyers with the most purchasing power. If the respondent
merely paid over part of his commission to the buyer, he clearly would have
violated the Act. We see no distinction of substance between the two transac-
tions. In each case the seller and his broker make a concession to the buyer as a
consequence of his economic power. In both cases the result is that the buyer has
received a discriminatory price. In both cases the seller's broker reduces his usual
brokerage fee to get a particular contract. There is no difference in economic
effect between the seller's broker splitting his brokerage commission with the
buyer and in his yielding part of the brokerage to the seller to be passed on to
the buyer in the form of a lower price.
5 8
363 U.S. at 175.
56 Id. at 180.
57 The FTC has applied § 2 (c) to seller's brokers. See Custom House Packing Corp.,
43 F.T.C. 164 (1946); Ramsdell Packing Co., 32 F.T.C. 1187 (1941); W. E. Robinson &
Co., 32 F.T.C. 370 (1941); C. F. Unruh Brokerage Co., 31 F.T.C. 1557 (1940), Albert W.
Sisk & Son, 31 F.T.C. 1543 (1940). But cf. D. J. Easterlin, FTC Dkt. 4587. A complaint
charging a seller's broker with violating § 2 (c) was issued 9/8/41 and dismissed 9/25/41
by the FTC without any reasons being specified.
-,.q 363 U.S. at 174-75.
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The Court added that not every price reduction coupled with a reduction
in brokerage automatically compels the conclusion that an allowance in
lieu of brokerage has been granted:
[W]hether such a reduction is tantamount to a discriminatory payment of
brokerage depends on the circumstances of each case .... A price reduction
based upon alleged savings in brokerage expenses is an "allowance in lieu of brok-
erage" when given only to favored customers .... Here . .. the reduction in
brokerage was made to obtain this particular order ... only and therefore was
clearly discriminatory. 59
Although the majority specifically stated that section 2(c) to be in-
dependent of section 2 (a), the Court, by way of dictum, fused the provi-
sions of section 2(a), which permits the defense of cost justification, with
those of section 2(c), which does not. Until this decision it seems to have
been generally understood that discrimination was not an element in the
FTC's application of section 2(c).1° But according to the majority opin-
ion, the reduction or elimination of a broker's fee would give rise to a
Brokerage Clause violation "when given only to favored customers.""
The Court pointed out that "the reduction in brokerage was made to ob-
tain this particular order and this order only and therefore was clearly
discriminatory." 62
This injection by the majority of the element of discrimination into
the brokerage clause upsets the position taken by the FTC for more than
twenty years. A host of Federal Trade Commission orders bar payments
under section 2(c) in the absence of discrimination among buyers.63 Re-
viewing courts have consistently supported this interpretation of section
2(c). As one court of appeals recently confirmed:
The fact that the granting of a purported brokerage fee to a buyer may in a
particular case result in discriminatory prices is immaterial. The gist of the vio-
lation under section 2(c) is not that discriminatory prices have been charged,
but that the parties have engaged in a practice designed to deceive others as to
the price charged and paid, whether or not discriminatory.
64
59 Id. at 176.
60The importance of the element of discrimination in the majority's reasoning is
reflected by at least eight separate references to it in its opinion. 363 U.S. at 173, 174,
175, 176, 177 n.19.
Gl 363 U.S. at 176.
62 Ibid.
63 Custom House Packing Corp., 43 F.T.C. 164 (1946); William R. Hill & Co., 42
F.T.C. 173 (1946); Paul Pankey & Co., 42 F.T.C. 148 (1946); Philips Sales Co., 42
F.T.C. 132 (1946); C. C. Waddill Co., 42 F.T.C. 125 (1946); G. B. Shelton Brokerage
Co., 42 F.T.C. 485 (1944); Howard E. Jones & Co., 31 F.T.C. 1538 (1940).
64 Federal Trade Commission v. Washington Fish & Oyster Co., 271 F.2d 39, 44 (9th
Cir. 1959). Accord, Robinson v. Stanley -Iome Products, Inc., 272 F.2d 601, 604 (Ist
Cir. 1959); Southgate Brokerage Co. v. Federal Trade Connission, 150 F.2d 607, 609
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This key misconception in the majority opinion's rationale of established
administrative practice under section 2(c), "could constitute a Pyrrhic
victory for the FTC by destroying a key premise of its administration of
the Brokerage Clause."65 This is not to say that the Broch case was in-
correctly decided. By ruling that a seller's broker is "any person" within
the meaning of section 2(c), the Supreme Court has abolished an "island
of monopoly immunity" giving a seller's broker a preferred status of ex-
emption from the section's proscriptions.6" The majority's view is sup-
ported by the authorities, 7 and to rule otherwise would be to sanction
the granting of preferential discounts to buyers through the medium of
the protected independent broker.68 There is precedent in a FTC decision
and a circuit court decision for the majority's position that a reduction in
price coupled with a reduction in brokerage may on the facts of the case
constitute an allowance or discount in lieu thereof, to the buyer. 69
The net result of the Supreme Court's adoption of this flexible standard
is to weaken materially the per se violation thrust that the FTC and the
courts have previously given section 2 (c). By so doing it has brought in-
terpretation of section 2(c) somewhat in line with the national antitrust
policy of promotion competition.7o However, in any transaction utilizing
an independent seller's broker where the broker lowers his commission to
make a deal, the FTC could take the position that the brokerage clause has
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 774 (1945); Fitch v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light &
Power Co., 136 F. 2d 12, 15 (6th Cir. 1943). See also Baysoy v. Jessop Steel Co., 90 F.
Supp. 303, 306 (W.D. Pa. 1950); and Note, 68 YALE L. J. 808, 824 n.87 (1959), which
states "§ 2 (c) is the only substantive section which does not deal with the discrimina-
tory treatment of two or more competitors. Since no question of discrimination exists,
and since the offense does not even require the presence of competitors, competitive
injury can have no relevance in a § 2 (c) case."
65 Petition for Rehearing at 6.
66 See authorities cited note 41 supra.
67 See. AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN Act 116 (2d rev. ed. 1959); EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW 104(1959); Oppenheim, Administration of the Brokerage Provision of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act, 8 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 511, 544 (1940); PATMAN, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT,
1938, at 102, 108. Patman, at 108, states: "Question. Does the Robinson-Patman law pro-hibit a broker from splitting his brokerage with a buyer? Opinion. Yes. It applies to any
person. The intent of Congress, the reports of committees, and the Act are all specific on
this point. The payment of any brokerage by the seller to the buyer is prohibited. The
relationship of the broker to his principal is a fiduciary one. He is, in fact, representing
the seller in this instance and would be liable."
68 See Note, 57 MIcH. L. REV. 926, 928 (1959).
69 Robinson v. Stanley Home Products, Inc., 272 F.2d 601, 604 (1st Cir. 1959), Main
Fish Co., Inc., 53 F.T.C. 88,97 (1956).
7U Automatic Canteen Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
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been violated and proceed against the seller or the buyer. In this event,
the FTC is not compelled to sustain the burden of proving either price
discrimination 7' and injury to competition under section 2(a) or, the
knowing inducement or receipt of an illegal price discrimination under
section 2(f). 72 The seller and the buyer are stripped of the defenses
which would be available to them if the proceedings were brought under
section 2(a) or section 2(f).
Mr. Justice Whittaker, in his dissenting opinion, expresses the view that
this transaction should be actionable only in a section 2(a) proceeding,
subject to any valid "cost justification" defense.73 This would permit
brokers to freely cooperate with sellers in passing true cost savings on to
the buyer and eventually to the consumer. But the minority view, i.e.,
that section 2(c) is applicable in all cases where a price reduction is cou-
pled with a reduction in brokerage or it is not applicable to any such case,
does not take into consideration that the FTC must show in each case that
the pricing variations are arithmetically commensurate with the pattern
of brokerage to establish that an allowance in lieu of brokerage has taken
place. There are numerous other factors which may cause price differ-
ences and make it difficult for the FTC to mathematically prove by the
greater weight of the evidence that these differences constitute payments
or allowances in lieu of brokerage. 74
IMPACT OF THE BROCH CASE
The major impact of the Broch case is that the Supreme Court closed a
large loophole in section 2(c) against price discriminations by exposing
seller's brokers to accountability for their agreements with their princi-
pals to manipulate brokerage, particularly in the field of food distribu-
tion.75 Unquestionably, the objective of the Robinson-Patman Act, and
of section 2(c) in particular, was to eliminate this type of preferential
treatment. A mass buyer desiring an unwarranted price concession is
solely interested in obtaining a preferential price and is not concerned
with whether brokerage is passed on to him by the seller or by the seller's
broker. Conceivably a buyer's dealings could be solely with the broker,
and he might not know that the lower price which he receives represents
71 This of course assumes that the F.T.C. will not follow the dictum of the Broch case.
72 15 U.S.C.A. S 13 (f) (Supp. 1959) states: "It shall be unlawful for any person en-
gaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, knowlingly to induce or receive
a discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section."
-7 363 U.S. at 187.
74 See Main Fish Co., Inc., 53 F.T.C. 88 (1956).
75 See F.T.C. Petition for Cert. (St. Ct.) pp. 6-7.
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a passing on to him of part of the commission of the seller's broker.76 If
the broker is not within the section, the enforcement of the section's man-
date against the buyer only would be, on such facts, an entirely ineffec-
tual method of administering the Brokerage Clause. In addition, the criti-
cal importance of this decision in the administration of section 2(c) is
shown by the number of cease and desist orders issued in proceedings in-
stituted after the instant case in which seller's brokers have been charged
with violating the section.77
While industry often absorbs the impact of a court decision on business
regulation in ways not quite foreseen, it would appear that the flexible
standard adopted by the court places brokers, sellers, and buyers in a
position where they must reduce brokerage charges at their own risk.
"Caveat actor," might be the only advice that legal counsel can give
brokers desirous of reducing their contracted commission rate in order to
make a sale. If the parties to the particular transaction guess wrong and
the FTC can show the reduction was uninfluenced by any other factors,
the parties are exposed to a cease and desist order. But assuming no other
factors, it might be necessary for a broker to reduce his brokerage in
order to compete successfully with fellow brokers.78
76 If the buyer is aware of the fact that the seller is cutting his commission, then it
appears that § 2 (f) would be applicable. See note 72 supra.
77 Representative cases include Puget Sound Brokerage Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP.
27,842 (Dkt. 7151, 1959); Parks Canning Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. 27,825 (Dkt. 7200,
1959); Independent Salmon Canneries, Inc., CCH TRADE REG. REP. 27,907 (Dkt. 7201,
1959) and (Dkts. 7202, 7204, 7208 and 7249, 1959). For a discussion of these developments
see Oppenheim, Selected Antitrust Developments in the Courts and the Federal Trade
Contmission During the Past Year, 15 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECrION PROCEEDINGS 37, 128
(1959).
78 The following examples based on the facts of the principal case will illustrate why
this is true: (1) Any other broker, who had never represented the seller before could
have made the same sale as the one in the Broch case, for the seller in question, to the
same buyer, at the same price, at a 3% or less commission, without being in violation
of the Robinson-Patman Act's section 2(c); (2) Assuming the same facts as we have
in the Broch case except that the respondent had agreed to and received 4% brokerage,
instead of 3%, this would still be a violation on the part of respondent. Yet, just as
obviously, it would not be a violation on the part of respondent's competitor, Tenser
and Phipps, if they had made the same sale, for the same seller, to the same purchaser,
for the same price, at the same 4% brokerage, because Tenser and Phipps had never
received more than 4% brokerage.
It is doubtful whether a broker who has contracted for a high rate of commission can
legally make a sale at all if the competitor broker has the same offer from the same
buyer. If the broker with the high rate of commission cannot legally accept any
brokerage less than what he has contracted for, without other market factors being
present, then, all other factors being ejual, a seller would naturally accept the order
through a competitor broker because it contracted to pay the competitor broker a
lower rate, which the broker with the high rate of commission refuses to accept for
fear of violating section 2 (c) of the Robinson-Patman Act. This would definitely inter-
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Finally, no discussion of the impact of the Brocb case would be com-
plete without mention of the perplexing problem of reconciling the
Court's decision with the "national antitrust policy" of removing artifi-
cial restraints upon free price competition. In Automatic Canteen v. Fed-
eral Trade Commission,79 the Supreme Court set aside a Robinson-Patman
Act interpretation by the FTC which fostered "a price uniformity and a
rigidity in open conflict with the purposes of other antitrust legislation." 80
This problem troubled the dissenting justices in the Brocb case and they
concluded that if the conduct involved in this case constituted allowance
in lieu of brokerage, "IT]hen all legitimate commission rates are frozen
in destruction of competition and in actual violation of the antitrust
laws.""' The Justices, in the majority opinion, reasoned that their deci-
sion did not establish an irrevocable floor under commission rates be-
cause the respondent was free to reduce his rates to all his buyers without
violating section 2(c).82 This is not a very satisfactory answer to the pol-
icy problem or solution to the practical problem. Perhaps the best reso-
lution of this conflict is the realization that the Supreme Court enforces a
"hard competition" policy with respect to the Sherman Antitrust Act
and has a "soft competition" philosophy with respect to the Robinson-
Patman Act. The Court uses both these policies to curb the price machina-
tions of manufacturers.83
Professor Oppenheim, a leading authority, has expressed the opinion in
several articles that Congress, in enacting the Robinson-Patman Act, gave
birth to a statute which has a duality of objectives, only some of which
fere with a broker's right to do business and to compete with other brokers. See
Memorandum of Reasons in Support of Respondents' Proposed Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law and Order and in Support of Respondents' Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint, pp. 30-31, In the Matter of Henry Broch & Co., 54 F.T.C. 673 (1957).
79 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
80 ld. at 63.
81 363 U.S. at 180. This was the dicta of the Seventh Circuit, 261 F.2d at 729. In argu-
ment before the Supreme Court, respondent emphasized this conflict (Brief for Re-
spondent, pp. 1, 46-51) and interestingly the F.T.C. admitted (Brief for F.T.C., p. 26)
that "the short-run effect of prohibiting Broch from passing on part of its brokerage to
the buyer may be viewed as tending toward some 'price rigidity and uniformity.'" A
noteworthy caveat on this point is contained in the F.T.C.'s petition (Petition for Cert.
(S. Ct.) p. 12, n. 7). The Solicitor General advises that "in appearing herein as legal
representative of the Commission, the Department of Justice intimates no views of its
own as to the underlying policy considerations that may be involved."
82 363 U.S. at 176.
83 Compare United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960), (a Sherman Act
case) with Federal Trade Commission v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 361 U.S. 880 (1960)
and the Brocb case which are Robinson-Patman Act cases. These cases were all de-
cided in the last term.
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are susceptible to reconciliation with "the broader antitrust policies." He
concludes that:
Despite its classification as one of the antitrust laws, Robinson-Patman is a mix-
ture of a few antitrust standards with other standards designed predominantly
to regulate the level of competition among individual competitors without proof
of substantial impairment of market competition9 4
CONCLUSION
Few will disagree that the Federal Trade Commission won an impor-
tant victory when the Supreme Court approved the application of the
Robinson-Patman Act's Brokerage Clause to seller's brokers. It remains to
be seen, however, whether the FTC will be as diligent in policing seller's
brokers as it has been in policing buyers and buyer's brokers.8 5 Viewing
the enforcement of the Brokerage Clause as a whole, critics of the Rob-
inson-Patman Act will no doubt point out that Henry Broch is but an-
other small businessman to suffer from rigid brokerage clause enforce-
ment, and that the Supreme Court's decision is another illustration that
the Robinson-Patman Act's Brokerage Clause, which was designed to aid
small businessmen and to hamper chain stores, is ironically being used as
an instrument to destroy small businessmen.86
84Oppenheim, Selected Antitrust Developments in the Courts and the Federal Trade
Commission During the Past Year, 15 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION PROCEEDINGS 37, 56
(1959).
8 5 See Edwards, Twenty Years of the Robinson-Patman Act, 29 J. Bus. U. OF CI.
149, 151 (1956) where the former Chief Economist of the F.T.C. says: "The predomi-
nance of brokerage cases is probably due partly to the zeal of the National Association
of Food Brokers in bringing violations of this section of the act to the commission's
attention and partly to the comparative simplicity of a proceeding under this section
of the statute."
86 For discussions of the effect of the brokerage cases on the relative well-being of
corporate chains and small independent distributors see Adelman, Effective Competi-
tion and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1289, 1334-37 (1948); [1955] ATr',. GEN.
NAT'L. COMM. ANTITRUST REP., 190; EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW 150-
152 (1959).
TAX-FREE GIFTS VS. TAXABLE INCOME
The income tax is imposed on income which is derived essentially ei-
ther from the labor and efforts of the taxpayer or from the use or dispo-
sition by him of capital.' As used in the sixteenth amendment,2 the term
"income" does not necessarily refer to all increases to one's wealth from
any source derived. The statutes promulgated since the sixteenth amend-
1 Noel v. Parrott, 15 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1926).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
